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Legitimacy, Rule of Law and Violent 
Conflicts in Africa 
Abstract 
The aim of this paper is two-fold. First, the paper analyses how citizens in 
fifteen African countries perceive key elements of governance, including the 
extent of legitimacy of constitutional, juridical, economic and political systems 
in Africa as well as perceptions of rule of law and violent conflicts in each of the 
fifteen countries. Second, the paper investigates the level and source of trust in 
government institutions. The analysis is based on the round 2 version of the 
Afrobarometer survey and employs descriptive analysis, factor analysis, scale 
item reliability analysis as well as OLS multiple regression analysis. Key 
findings show that the majority of respondents prefer a mixed economy, 
democratic governance, support the national constitutions and accept that 
courts and police should enforce the law in the respective countries. Violent 
conflicts are perceived to be caused by a multitude of factors (not just ethnic and 
religious factors), but are not acceptable to the respondents as a means of 
achieving political objectives. Generally, findings show that trust in public 
institutions is low and that political trust is primarily influenced by how 
government performs in the arenas of socio-economic management and civil 
rights protection. Perceptions of corruption among elected and public officials 
are high. The paper concludes by highlighting that democratic transition in 
Africa has progressed, but still faces many dangers. The major threats to 
democratisation are the social, economic and political crises in Africa which 
have been worsened by IMF/World Bank Structural Adjustment Programmes.   
1. Introduction  
Why should citizens voluntarily obey the commands of the state? Why should 
they trust or support the government of their country? A very plausible answer 
to the two questions that has been offered by social philosophers and theorists 
over the ages is that obedience and support are justifiable only if the state and 
government are legitimate. This implies that a citizen is morally obliged to obey 
the state and support the government only if they are rightly constituted in 
accordance with popularly accepted constitutional and legal order aimed at 
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promoting the common good and realising the aspirations of the generality of 
the people through widely preferred political and economic regimes. Simply 
stated, the state commands should be obeyed and the government should be 
supported if they are legitimately constituted organs of society for the pursuit of 
safety, security, welfare and liberties (Rousseau 1947; Locke 1988). 
The term ‘consent’ features in philosophical discourse on power, authority and 
legitimacy. Classical social philosophy and theory placed consent at the heart of 
power relations in society. Several classical social philosophers and theorists 
like Plato, Hobbes, Rousseau, Locke and Weber articulated the grounds for the 
constitution of societal sovereign authority. The social philosophers and 
theorists devoted their efforts to articulating grounds or conditions for legitimate 
exercise of power in the context of collective social, economic and political life. 
Citizens can invest and disinvest their consent or legitimacy in a state or 
government based on the extent to which the common good (security of life and 
person; safety of property, economic and social welfare of individual citizen, 
and liberties from violence, exploitation and oppression) is promoted and 
guaranteed for every citizen on the basis of inherent equal worth (Plato 1955; 
Hobbes 1992; Rousseau 1947; Locke 1988; Weber 1978,   Mills 1964). 
Legitimacy is the basis for voluntary obedience to state laws and support for 
government. It is in this light that St Augustine conceives the guarantee of 
justice to everyone as the legitimate basis for the existence of the state. 
According to him, the guarantee of justice by the state distinguishes its exercise 
of power from the command or use of force by bands of robbers. Thus, St 
Augustine argues that a state without justice is nothing but a band of robbers. In 
the Augustinian tradition, which found expression in the natural law approach in 
jurisprudence, justice – treating everyone as persons with inherent equal worth, 
rendering unto each what they deserve on account of what they have done, and 
ensuring or guaranteeing the security and welfare liberties of every citizen – is 
the foundation of legitimacy of state, regimes and governments (St. Augustine 
1998). In complex modern societies, how can the consent of the citizens to the 
powers and activities of the state be expressed and determined? Contemporary 
social science offers an answer. Consent is expressed through elections and 
expression of trust or confidence in the government. As a result, empirical social 
science literature uses political trust or confidence in and support for 
government as proxies for consent and legitimacy (Weatherford 1992; Levi and 
Stoker 2000). 
The rule of law is a cornerstone of democratic governance (Rosenfeld 2001). 
However, rule of law is compatible with non-democratic governance, to the 
extent that it focuses on process rather than substance of law (Hayek 1944, Raz 
1979; Alemika 2003a). Democratic governance must embody the rule of law. 
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The rule of law doctrine embodies the principles that: (a) citizens should be 
subjected only to the law; (b) laws should be promulgated to take effect 
prospectively rather than retroactively; (c) legislative functions should be 
independent of executive functions and duties and subject only to judicial 
review in accordance with the provisions of a national ground juridical norms - 
constitution or convention; (d) judicial functions and officials should be 
independent of interference from the executive and legislative arms of 
government and granted powers to review executive and legislative decisions in 
a accordance with constitutive laws, and (e) all citizens are equal under the law 
and no one within the polity is above the law. The essence of the rule of law is 
to limit arbitrary exercise of power by the state, protect human rights, guarantee 
equality and ensure effective enforcement of law. These principles coincide with 
some of the constitutive elements of liberal democracy. They also mirror the 
fictive compact between the state and citizens as postulated by social contract 
philosophy of the state and citizenship (Dicey 1982; Dahl 1989; Rosenfeld 
2001). 
Social conflicts are embedded in social interactions. The coexistence of 
individuals and groups necessarily entails plurality of competing interests. If the 
competing interests are not regulated, or if there are no institutionalised 
mechanisms for resolving conflicts, violence may be employed as an instrument 
for the pursuit and realisation of interests by groups. In essence, violent conflicts 
emanate from absence of consent over the management of competing interests 
and absence or weakness of institutionalised mechanisms for the management of 
conflicting interests (Coser 1967; Boulding 1963; Oberschall 1978). In 
governance, therefore, legitimacy, rule of law and conflicts are interrelated and 
characterised by dynamic tension (Rosenfeld 2001; Dicey 1982; Dahl 1989). 
Empirically, how are they related? This paper analyses legitimacy, rule of law 
and violent conflicts in Africa. 
2. Focus of the Study 
This paper examines the perceptions of citizens in fifteen countries on 
legitimacy, the rule of law, and incidence of violent conflicts in their respective 
nations. It also analyses the sources or determinants of trust in government 
institutions among the citizens in the countries. Descriptive and multivariate 
analyses are undertaken in this study.  
At the descriptive level of the study, we examine the following issues: 
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1. The extent to which the national constitutions of the 15 African 
countries1, included in the round 2 survey of Afrobarometer2, are 
perceived by the citizens as expressing their values and hopes. In other 
words, to what extent do citizens regard their national constitution as 
legitimate? Constitution is the primary juridical norm that governs the 
structure of the state, powers of the state and government, citizenship 
and the overall political economic structure. Its legitimacy or otherwise 
in the perception of the citizens has serious implications. 
2. The extent to which the citizens perceive their nations’ political and 
economic regimes - democracy and market economy - to be legitimate 
as well as their assessment of their functioning. 
3. Extent of trust in the core political institutions by the citizens of the 
fifteen African countries. Trust is generally used in the literature as 
proxy for legitimacy. 
4. Citizens’ assessment of the capacity of their country’s government to 
enforce the law if they violate it. This aspect assesses perceptions of 
state legal capacity and equality of enforcement and administration of 
law, which are very crucial to the rule of law. 
5. Extent of violent conflicts and criminality in the countries. Violence 
erodes legitimacy of and trust in government because of failure to 
guarantee the fundamental needs of security and safety. 
The multivariate analysis component of this study examines the extent to which 
the legitimacy of government measured by trust correlated with citizens’ 
perceptions of the management of economic and social services, civil rights, 
conflicts, corruption, legal capacity, age, gender and party affiliation. 
3. Literature and Conceptual Framework  
The major features of the crises in many African countries are (a) contestation of 
the legitimacy of regime and government; (b) repression and non-observance of 
rule of law, impunity by government institutions and officials; (c) poor 
                                                 
1 The countries are Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. 
 
2 “The Afrobarometer is an independent, nonpartisan research project that measures the social, 
political and economic atmosphere in Africa. Afrobarometer surveys are conducted in more 
than a dozen African countries and are repeated on a regular cycle. Because the instrument 
asks a standard set of questions, countries can be systematically compared. Trends in public 
attitudes are tracked over time" (www.afrobarometer.org, accessed 13 July 2004). 
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economic, political and social performance3 and (d) incivility and violence by 
politicians and segments of the public. These problems have arisen largely from 
the authoritarian and patrimonial political economy of the nations. 
Unfortunately, the problems are mutually reinforcing to the extent that a vicious 
circle of authoritarianism, arbitrariness and impunity, poor economic and social 
performance and erosion of legitimacy fuel armed conflicts or intermittent 
violent conflicts.  
Democratisation offers promise for breaking the vicious circle. However 
democratisation must involve or bring about structural transformation, value 
reorientation, inclusive participation and efficacious citizenship rather than mere 
electoralism. Current forms and waves of political and economic liberalisation 
in Africa may only deregulate the material, intellectual and moral poverty which 
may lead to either state collapse or reinstallation of authoritarianism. Most 
African countries that have implemented the structural adjustment programmes 
(imposed by IMF, World Bank and advanced capitalist, especially the G8 
countries) since the mid-1980s, are worse off – economically, politically and 
socially – than they were prior to the introduction of such programmes.    
3.1 Legitimacy of Regime (System) and Government 
(Incumbent Ruling Group) 
There are two major dimensions of legitimacy. First, legitimacy of the 
institutions and rules that structure, define and regulate fundamental juridical, 
socio-political, economic and cultural relationships, power, means and goals or 
ends in society, which may be referred to as the constitutional, political and 
economic regimes. Second, the government’s use of the constitution, political 
and economic rules to achieve the goals to which the society commits itself, in 
other words performance. Legitimacy enhances the credibility, stability and the 
institutionalisation of state structure and governments. The recurring crises in 
African polities are symptomatic of the lack of legitimacy. In classical social 
                                                 
3 Performance in (a) economic terms (job creation to prevent high unemployment, poverty 
reduction, reducing wide inequalities, promoting industrial productivity, efficiency and equity 
in the use of resources and distribution of resulting benefits; enhancing economic 
diversification, investments and international trade, human capital development and 
scientific/technological development); (b) political terms (promoting social and efficacious 
citizenship through the guarantee of participation, inclusive governance, and generally social 
democratic governance, rather than limited capitalist/free market driven liberal democracy 
with its shallowness of emphasis on electoralism and formal equality rather than substantive 
equality), and (c) social terms (guaranteeing human rights, universal access to (i) cultural, 
scientific and technological education and development; (ii) food security, (iii) health care, 
and safety and security). 
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philosophy and theories that have evolved around the social contract doctrine, 
the state exists for instrumental reasons and therefore derives its legitimacy 
(acceptance and support by citizens as expression of their sovereign will and 
rights) only if it effectively carries out the envisaged duties of guaranteeing 
everyone the security of their person, property and dignity. Social scientists, 
especially sociologists and political scientists, continue to examine the extent of 
legitimacy enjoyed by state institutions and officials in nations.   
There are very few concise definitions of legitimacy in social science literature. 
Max Weber identified three types of domination (power or authority) – tradition, 
charisma and legal rationality as well as the grounds for legitimising them. 
Traditional domination is legitimised by tradition or culture. For example, the 
right to ‘traditional or customary leadership or chieftancy’ is justified on 
historical practices or customs, delineating who is qualified and through what 
process of selection and installation. In Africa, this form of claim to domination 
existed before colonial rule, reconfigured during the colonial and post-colonial 
eras, no longer as autonomous power but a subordinate coalition with the 
national (trans-cultural) state (Ekeh 1980, Mamdani 1996).  
The legitimation of power may also depend on the charisma of the ruler. This is 
more frequently found in, but not limited to, the religious arena. But, even 
modern rulers are frequently evaluated as to whether or not they possess 
charisma to supplement their power derived from the constitution or statutes 
(legal rational form of legitimation). Weber noted that charismatic domination 
tends to be short-lived because it is dependent on personal attributes of the ruler, 
which is not transferable. Therefore, for charismatic domination to persist in the 
community, it must be routinised as either customary power or as a legal-
rational form of power. The legitimacy of powers exercised by modern states 
and bureaucracies is governed by legal rationality, characterised by impersonal 
rules, roles and status which are at the same differentiated and coordinated 
horizontally and vertically.  
Legitimacy has normative and evaluative dimensions as well as objective and 
subjective components. Ultimately, it expresses relationships between groups: 
governed and governors, employers and employees, law enforcement 
institutions and crime suspects, cleric and congregation. It raises the question of 
the grounds relied on (i.e. rights) to demand compliance with commands or 
directives to perform given duties. Suchman (1995: 577) offers a definition of 
legitimacy that underscores the inter-subjectivity of the concept. According to 
him, legitimacy refers to “a generalized perception or assumption that the 
actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially 
constructed system of norms, values and beliefs, and definitions” (emphasis 
added). He suggests that: 
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‘… when one says that a certain pattern of behavior possesses 
legitimacy, one asserts that some group of observers, as a whole, 
accepts or supports what those observers perceive to be the 
behavioral pattern as a whole – despite reservations that any single 
observer might have about any single behavior’ (Ibid: 574).  
Legitimacy or illegitimacy is ascribed to institutions, rules, offices, commands 
and actions based on the evaluative criteria of appropriateness, propriety, 
efficiency and equity.  
Social scientists have attempted to construct empirical referents for the concept 
of legitimacy. However, Weatherford (1992:149) observes that “the concept is 
too unwieldy and complex … to be grappled in a frontal assault”. As a result, 
the concept is often broken into components like “alienation, political trust, 
mode of participation, and political efficacy” (Ibid: 149).  The most common 
measure of legitimacy in empirical political science literature is trust in society’s 
regime of rule, administration and production/distribution (constitutional, 
political and economic systems); institutions (executive, legislative, judicial, 
military, law enforcement, financial, industrial and religious bodies, etc.), and 
officials (president, judges, police, law-makers, etc.). Legitimacy of liberal 
democratic governance is evaluated by the majority of political scientists in 
terms of rules and process rather than on substantive outcomes of distributive 
justice and de facto equality. This approach is dictated by the form and character 
or content of liberal democracy as a method and process (Dahl 1989).  
Weatherford  (1992) points out that: 
‘Historians and political theorists distinguish legitimate from 
illegitimate governments by focusing on constitutional provisions 
that establish the opportunity for wide participation and ensure 
procedural regularity, especially provisions dealing with majority 
rule, minority rights, and accountability in regular and frequent 
elections’ (Ibid: 150). 
This conception emphasises constitutionalism and electoral process. 
Nonetheless, Weatherford proposes that four concerns should feature in the 
evaluation of the legitimacy of a democratic regime: accountability, efficiency, 
procedural fairness and distributive fairness. Expectations and performance play 
a critical role in the ascription of legitimacy to political institutions by citizens. 
Peet and Simon (2000: 659-660) state that: 
‘Political authority is granted legitimacy to the extent that the power 
is exercised in a manner that complements the social expectations 
between the rulers and the ruled. To maintain legitimacy, 
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governments must use political power in a manner consistent with 
the purpose for which it is granted. Thus, governments are 
constrained by the legitimate social purpose of political power’. 
The terms ‘attitudes’ and ‘belief’ have featured in the attempt to operationalise 
and empirically measure democratic legitimacy. Montero et al. (1997: 126) 
defines democratic legitimacy as “citizens’ positive attitudes towards democratic 
institutions, which are considered to be the most appropriate from of 
government”. Similarly, Linz defines it as “the belief that, in spite of 
shortcomings and failures, the political institutions are better than any others that 
might be established (Linz 1988: 65 – cited in Montero et al. 1997). These 
conceptions differ from the dimension of legitimacy measured by trust, which 
are nonetheless conflated by many. Definitions provided by Montero et al. 
(1997) and Linz (1988) measure system or regime legitimacy while trust 
measurements gauge the legitimacy of the incumbent government, usually based 
on perceptions of its policies, programmes, decisions, actions and performance. 
There is a need to assess the two levels independently – regime or system 
legitimacy and government legitimacy.  
The critical question is what do citizens evaluate when determining the 
legitimacy or otherwise of regimes and governments? Do they distinguish 
between system (regime) legitimacy and government (ruling groups in power) 
legitimacy? Does the performance of government in critical areas of 
governances such as the economy and social services provisioning influence 
citizens’ evaluation of regime legitimacy or government legitimacy or both? 
Empirical social science literature show that the evaluation of system legitimacy 
is more stable than that of government legitimacy which is more likely to be 
influenced by the performance of the incumbent government (Weatherford, 
1992; Vassilev 2004; Lewis et al. 2001; Levi and Stoker 2000; Weil 1989). As 
indicated above, the concept of trust has often been used as an indicator of the 
extent of the legitimacy of government – its institutions and officials in 
empirical social science literature.  
Trust judgments are believed to be influenced by an array of factors. Levis and 
Stoker (2000: 480) state that they are “influenced by evaluation of the 
performance of incumbent president, particularly in economic realm; by 
evaluations of the leaders’ personal qualities; and by dissatisfaction with the 
policies being promoted for implementation by the current government”.   The 
implication for the social science research and theory is that citizens’ evaluation 
of legitimacy includes, but is not limited to, the narrow constitutional and 
procedural parameter employed in accordance with the minimalist definition of 
democracy (Dahl 1989). The wider perspective of the citizens is captured by 
Miller and Listhaug (1990: 358) observation that trust judgment: 
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‘… reflects evaluations of whether or not political authorities and 
institutions are performing in accordance with normative 
expectations held by the public. Citizen expectations of how 
government should operate include among other criteria, that it be 
fair, equitable, honest, efficient, and responsive to society’s need. In 
brief, an expression of trust in government (or synonymously 
political confidence and support) is a summary judgment that the 
system is responsive and will do what is right even in the absence of 
constant scrutiny’. 
In the context of Africa, two factors – corruption and violent conflicts - have 
been identified as sources of distrust for regimes and governments. However, 
there have been very few attempts to empirically examine their impacts. The 
Afrobarometer data set contains information that can be employed to fill this 
gap, and this paper will explore the problem in later sections. For now, we 
discuss the literature on the impact of corruption on legitimacy.  
3.1.1 Corruption and Legitimacy 
Corruption erodes democratic principles of accountability, transparency, 
equality and fairness (Anderson and Tverdova, 2003: 92) as well as efficiency in 
the use of resources. All countries manifest varying levels and types of 
corruption which are embedded in their social, economic and political structures 
(Zack-William and Alemika, 1986; Alemika, 2002; Anderson and Tverdova, 
2003). In many African countries, corruption is widespread and permeates 
transactions in the public service, private corporations and civil society 
(Alemika 2002). Corruption is also rooted in the clientelism or prebendalism 
that characterises African political economies (Joseph 1987; Alemika 2002). A 
consequence of prebendalism is that politics and electoral competition become 
means of corrupt accumulation, as access to the state guarantees opportunities 
for illicit private enrichment, thereby turning competition for political power 
into a warfare that threaten credibility of elections and triggers electoral violence 
in African countries (Ake 1996a, 1996b; Alemika 2004). The problem of 
corruption in Africa is complicated by the fact that the agencies responsible for 
its control (especially judiciary and the police) are some of the most corrupt 
public institutions (Alemika 2003a, 2003b). The overall effect is that the 
legitimacy of government is undermined because corruption violates the 
principles of democratic governance, leads to gross inefficiency, widens 
inequality, engenders and aggravates political instability and repression. 
Anderson and Tverdova (2003) found a strong correlation between high levels 
of corruption and negative evaluations of the political system as well as low 
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level of trust in public officials. They attribute the relationship to the nature of 
democratic ethos: 
‘The principles underlying democratic political systems presume 
that governments are accountable to their citizens, that they 
administer laws equitably and fairly, that their actions are 
transparent, and that all citizens have access to the political process’ 
(Anderson and Tverdova 2003: 91). 
They rightly argue that when a system fails to satisfy these expectations, it will 
be plagued by legitimation crisis. Corruption is a major factor that undermines 
the fulfillment of these expectations by political and other organisations and 
actors. 
Democratisation is often prescribed as a cure for corruption and mechanism for 
ensuring accountability. In Africa, democratisation has been accompanied by 
economic liberalization (deregulation, privatisation and commercialisation of 
public utilities and social services). In the context of Africa and Latin America, 
such adjustment programmes were usually introduced following the advice of 
the IMF, World Bank, WTO and the G8 countries. Among other requirements, 
they prescribe government abdication (withdrawal) of responsibility for the 
economic and social security of citizens and the transfer of public/national 
wealth into private (cartel of local and foreign) hands (e.g. privatisation). These 
have either created or aggravated serious problems of poverty arising from 
retrenchment, lack of access to education, health care, housing and employment. 
The implementation of such adjustment has, in many contexts, spurred 
repression of workers and students who are opposed to such programmes, while 
the privatisation of public enterprises are characterised by corruption. The 
experience of Nigeria is illustrative of this point. The adjustment programme 
embarked upon since the mid-1980s has contributed to the increasing level of 
poverty (from under 50 percent in early 1980s to 70 percent living below 
poverty line in 2003), deterioration of industrial production and social services, 
corruption and repression, and identity politics that have exacerbated ethnic, 
religious and communal violence (Jega 2000; Alemika 1998; Olukoshi 1993; see 
also Storeym 2001). 
Democratic transition may generate new forms of corruption and compound 
existing ones, as has been demonstrated by the evidence from Eastern Europe 
following the ‘collapse’ of state communism. However, in the long-term, if 
democratisation is successfully consolidated, petty and undisguised corruption 
should diminish as accountability and transparency are institutionalised (Moran 
2001). But in the short-run, corruption coupled with authoritarian 
implementation of economic adjustment towards capitalism can generate levels 
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of inequality, poverty and violence that may undermine and reverse transition to 
liberal democracy and capitalism. Moran (2001) highlights the relationship 
between corruption and crime, legitimacy and government’s economic and 
social services provisioning: 
‘State strength and/or legitimacy is an important correlate with 
corruption. Where state capacity in the areas of law 
enforcement/social control is limited in the face of increased social 
and political freedom, corruption and crime may develop. Where the 
state cannot satisfy demands for basic social services, regime 
legitimacy may decline, leading to petty corruption and crime’ (Ibid: 
389). 
Corruption undermines the legitimacy of government because in a society where 
the practice is widespread and endemic, the expectations of governance, security 
and safety, economic and social welfare, rights and freedoms, and especially the 
rule of law cannot be fulfilled. Social sciences in Africa need to examine and 
empirically establish the linkages among corruption, legitimacy, rule of law, 
economic and social services management by the government. 
3.2 Rule of Law in African Countries 
The rule of law doctrine expresses several elements of democratic governance. 
Central to the doctrine are precepts of equality under law and equal protection 
by law as well as prohibition of arbitrary (unpredictable) exercise of power by 
the government and especially its coercive agencies (police and security 
services). The modern conception of the term “rule of law” is traced to A. V. 
Dicey, an English jurist.  According to Dicey, the rule of law implies that: 
‘No man is punishable or can be lawfully made to suffer in body or 
goods except for a distinct breach of law established in the ordinary 
legal manner before the ordinary court of the land. In this sense the 
rule of law is contrasted with every system of government based on 
the exercise by person in authority of wide, arbitrary, or 
discretionary powers of constraint’ (Dicey 1982: 110) 
Dicey’s definition emphasises what in the American legal tradition is referred to 
as due process of law, especially precedent to coercive restraint and liability. 
Another principle of the “rule of law” stipulated by Dicey is that “no man is 
above the law …” Consequently, he argued that “every man, whatever may be 
his rank or condition is subject to the ordinary law of the realm and amenable to 
the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals” (Dicey 1982: 114).  
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Hayek (1944: 75) argued that the rule of law “means that government in all its 
actions is bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand”. The significance of 
this element of the rule of law is to “make it possible to foresee with fair 
certainty how the authority will use its coercive power in given circumstances, 
and to plan one’s individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge”.  Again, 
Hayek’s description underscores predictability of the actions of government or 
organisations based on pre-existing rules. Similar definitions of the rule of law 
have been provided by Nwabueze (1992), a leading Nigerian constitutional 
lawyer. He argues that the basic concern of the rule of law is to ensure “that the 
government is executed and administered according to law; that disputes are 
adjudicated impartially according to law by regular, ordinary courts which are 
independent of disputants” (Ibid: 18). Nwabueze points out that the doctrine of 
the rule of law implies “that the ordinary laws applied in the execution of 
government and adjudication of disputes are made according to some basic, 
fundamental rules which regulate both the permissible content and the form of 
such laws, as well as the procedure for making them” (Ibid: 18). The overall 
goal of the rule of law doctrine, argues Nwabueze, is “is to limit, and thereby to 
check, the arbitrary, oppressive and despotic tendencies of power and to ensure 
equal treatment and protection for all, irrespective of sex, class, status, religion, 
place of origin or political opinion” (Ibid: 18).  
Lon Fuller in his work on the morality of law extends the debate on the features 
of the rule of law by linking it with the natural law principles and as 
preconditions for legal efficacy. He identified the following actions that will 
constitute a perversion of the law:  
1. Failure to achieve rules at all, so that every issue must be decided on an ad 
hoc basis;  
2. Failure to publicise, or at least to make available to the affected party, the 
rules he is expected to observe;  
3. Abuse of retroactive legislation, which not only cannot itself guide action, 
but undercuts the integrity of rules prospective in effect, since it puts them 
under the threat of retrospective change;  
4. Failure to make rules understandable;  
5. Enactment of contradictory rules; or  
6. Rules that require conduct beyond the power of the affected party;  
7. Frequent changes in the rules such that the subject cannot orient his actions 
by them; and finally  
8. Failure of congruence between the rules as announced and their actual 
administration (Ibid 1991: 182). 
Fuller also linked the rule of law to the legitimacy of government as well as 
citizens’ duty to obey the law. He argues that “there can be no rational ground 
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for asserting that a man have a moral obligation to obey a legal rule that does not 
exist, or is kept secret from him, or that came into existence only after he had 
acted, or was unintelligible, or was contradicted by another rule of the same 
system, or commanded the impossible, or changed every minute (Ibid 1991: 
182).   
Raz, an English legal philosopher, following the argument of Fuller contended 
that the requirements of the rule of law are that: 
1. All laws should be prospective, open and clear, relatively stable, guided 
by open, stable, clear and general rules;  
2. Independence of the judiciary must be guaranteed;  
3. The principle of natural justice must be observed;  
4. The courts should have review powers over the implementation of the 
other principles;  
5. The court should be easily accessible’ and the discretion of the crime-
preventing agencies should not be allowed to pervert the law (Ibid 1979: 
214-218). 
These elements are very critical and span the three major spheres of a legal 
order: law making, enforcement and adjudication. This brief discussion indicates 
that the rule of law doctrine is multi-dimensional with wide-ranging implications 
for governance.  
Observance of rule of law is either weak or eroded in many African countries for 
several reasons:  
1. African governments, for most of their existence, have been totalitarian in 
the form of colonialism, apartheid, post-colonial one-party and military 
regimes. 
2. Legislatures are emasculated and therefore are unable to produce a strong 
juridical framework for the rule of law. The emasculation of African 
legislatures was effected through authoritarian party structures, executive 
control and manipulation of budgetary allocation and disbursement, and 
corrupt inducement of individual legislators (Alemika 2003a; Monga 
1997).  
3. The judiciary is weak and dependent on the Executive organ for several 
reasons. Firstly, the mechanism of funding often renders the judiciary 
under-funded and at the mercy of the executive. Secondly, the military 
regimes and one-party system in African countries weaken the judiciary 
through either ouster clauses or the appointment and security of their 
tenure of judges. Thirdly, the executive and wealthy members of society 
corrupt a significant proportion of the judges. Some judges are also 
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swayed or influenced by ethnic and religious considerations. These 
considerations have weakened the judiciary and prevented it from serving 
as a restrain on executive lawlessness.  
4. The capacity of the citizen to ensure adherence to the rule of law through 
litigation is inhibited by several factors including: (a) mass poverty and 
the absence of public assistance in litigating human rights violations; (b) 
the physical distance of courts from many communities, especially in 
rural areas; (c) alienating technical language and proceedings of courts, 
and (d) public mistrust of the courts.  
5. The transition to a multiparty system has not necessarily translated into a 
fundamental restructuring of socio-political institutions and civil society; 
they are thus not strong enough to restrain the government from 
arbitrariness and make government institutions accountable. Many factors 
weaken the capacity of citizens to demand and ensure that their 
governments observe and guarantee the rule of law. These include: the 
rapidly growing level of poverty, deterioration of social service; 
exorbitant cost of health, educational and other social welfare goods 
occasioned by government privatisation and abdication of duty in the 
areas; unemployment, especially among graduates of secondary and 
tertiary institutions which has accompanied democratisation and 
liberalisation. 
These reasons combine to explain the weakness or erosion of the rule of law in 
many African countries, which also in part account for the tendency of 
individuals, communities and groups to resort to self-help and lawlessness when 
they are in conflict or dispute with others.  Although law enforcement agencies 
have great power, the grossly inadequate scrutiny of executive police powers 
and activities post a threat to the rule of law. 
3.3 Social Conflict and Violent Conflict 
Frequently social conflict and violent conflict are used interchangeably. 
However, sociologists and criminologists make a distinction between the two 
concepts. Sociologists insist that social conflict is endemic and sometimes 
functional in enhancing social solidarity and catalysing social changes in society 
(Boulding 1963; Coser 1967). It is important that the characteristics of the 
concepts are distinguished in social scientific analysis. 
Social conflict is a wider term than violent conflict because it incorporates 
violent and non-violent conflicts. From a sociological point of view, most 
conflicts, which occur on a daily basis as part of social relations are non-violent 
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and regulated through numerous institutionalised mechanisms. Social conflict is 
a product of and embedded in interaction between groups. Conflicts of interests 
between groups lead to the questioning of social relations and the values, norms 
and rules that underlie them. Consequently, with struggles, balance of power 
may be altered and so also social relations. The changes may create a new level 
of stability that will enhance development in society. Social conflicts may either 
be transformative or destructive depending on how they are managed and the 
compromise that combatants are willing to make.  
Violent conflicts results from absence, failure or weakening of institutionalised 
mechanisms for channeling and regulating social conflicts. In short, violent 
conflicts can be conceptualised as unregulated social conflicts. Coser (1967: 
232) defines social conflict as “a struggle over values or claims to status, power, 
and scarce resources, in which the aims of the conflict groups are not only to 
gain the desired values, but also to neutralize, injure or eliminate rivals”. His 
definition covers the full range of non-violent and violent conflicts. Boulding 
(1963: 5) observes that conflict “is a situation of competition in which the 
parties are aware of the incompatibility of potential future positions and in 
which each partly wishes to occupy a position that is incompatible with the 
wishes of others”. In a society with effective conflict management mechanisms, 
the sort of conflicts alluded to by Boulding can be negotiated and resolved on 
the basis of compromise and win-win principle of conflict management to the 
advantage of both parties. However, where an effective conflict resolution 
mechanism is absent, conflict assumes zero-sum warfare in which an attitude of 
victory or defeat prevails. The ubiquity of social conflict is demonstrated by 
Obserchall (1978:291) observation that “social conflict encompasses a broad 
range of social phenomena: class, racial, religious, and communal conflicts; 
riots, rebellion, revolutions; strikes and civil disorders, marches, demonstrations, 
protest gatherings, and the like”. This statement points to both the sources 
(social differentiation) and expressions or manifestations of conflicts. 
Violence is a multidimensional phenomenon that manifests in different ways at 
interpersonal, family, group, intra-state and inter-state levels. Attitudes to 
violence are ambiguous. It is widespread yet condemned. Its use is praised in 
some circumstances such as war but abhorred in other situations. It is often 
employed in different sites such as family, class, ethnic, religious, political, 
socio-cultural and economic interactions. Tilly (2003), a notable scholar on 
violence, states that collective (as opposed to individual or interpersonal) 
violence involves  
‘….episodic interaction that: 
• immediately inflicts physical damage on persons and objects (‘damage’ 
include forcible seizure of persons or objects over restrain or resistance); 
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• involves at least two perpetrators of damage; and  
• results at least in part from coordination among persons who perform the 
damaging acts’ (Ibid: 3).    
Tilly identified two groups of actors that are critical to the initiation, pattern, 
scale and termination of collective violence. These are the political 
entrepreneurs and specialists in the deployment of violent means. He argues that 
political entrepreneurs “specialize in activation, connection, coordination and 
representation” (Ibid: 34). Their activities involve  
‘activating (and sometimes deactivating) boundaries, stories, and 
relations … connecting (and sometimes disconnecting) distinct 
groups and networks … coordination, as when those leaders 
organize joint action on the part of those coalitions, and finally … 
representation’ (Ibid: 34).    
As a result of their activities, “political entrepreneurs wield significant influence 
over the presence, absence, form, loci, and intensity of collective violence” 
(ibid: 34). Tilly provides us with useful information for the analysis of the 
dynamics of violence, especially of ethnic, religious, political and economic 
types that are commonly witnessed in Africa. Political entrepreneurs in African 
nations mobilise one group against another or others, often to benefit themselves 
more than the generality of the group memberships which they claim to 
represent in the articulation of grievances and negotiating settlement. The 
specialists in the deployment of violence include the state security agencies, 
state-sponsored militias and death-squads, ethnic and religious militias, political 
thugs, roving bandits and vigilantes.  
The past century has witnessed many wars and different types of conflicts with 
varying consequences in different part of the world. There have also been shifts 
in the character of violent conflicts during the period: 
‘During the first half of the twentieth century, massive interstate 
wars produced most of the world’s political deaths … During the 
century’s second half, civil war, guerrilla, separatist struggles, 
domestic political repression and conflicts between ethnically or 
religiously divided populations increasingly dominated the 
landscape of bloodletting’ (Tilly 2001: 13). 
Notwithstanding the ubiquity of violence, it is nonetheless recognised that social 
life and social order are adversely affected under conditions of violent conflicts, 
precisely because life and activities become uncertain and unpredictable. 
Violence destroys life, the basis and feeling of humanity and community as well 
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as property. It thereby erodes trust and associational life on a relatively large 
scale.  The consequences of violent conflicts are predictable – they include 
death, injury, trauma, homelessness, poverty which often result from destruction 
of property (including farmlands and consequently famine), displacement (both 
internally and international) and erosion of the rule of law and wastages of 
resources for the democratic and economic development of society. 
Africa has for various historical political, economic and socio-cultural factors 
been a theatre of large-scale violent conflicts and violence. Violent conflicts 
involve the use of lethal weapons by antagonistic groups to pursue political, 
economic, ethnic, religious or cultural objectives. In many parts of the world 
today, inter-state and intra-state wars, rioting, terrorism, inter-ethno-religious 
conflicts, state repression, military rebellion and coups, militias and crime are 
lived experiences of millions of people. Africa has witnessed numerous civil 
wars, coups, state repression, insurgency and counter-insurgency, and 
economically induced violent conflicts that often manifest in protracted or 
intermittent ethnic and religious conflicts that undermine economic 
development, democracy and good governance. A vicious circle of violence, 
undemocratic rule and economic backwardness has developed in Africa. This 
needs to be broken in order for the continent to pursue sustainable development 
and democratic governance by guaranteeing citizens continuously improved 
material conditions of existence, rule of law, human dignity and liberties.  
Contrary to the image of Africa in the Western media as the main site of 
collective violence, more violent conflicts have been reported outside Africa 
during the past two decades. Erickson et al. (2003) recorded and analysed 226 
armed conflicts in 148 locations that occurred between 1989 and 2002. They 
classified 104 of them as minor (involving 25-1000 deaths); 11 as intermediate 
(involving 1000 or more deaths but producing less than 1000 deaths in any 
given year, and 111 as war ( involving more than 1000 deaths in any given 
year). Wallensteen and Sollenberg (2000) listed 467 instances of conflicts 
between 1989 and 1999. Analysis of the data presented by them provides the 
following regional distribution – Africa (155), Americas (39), Asia (174), 
Europe (46), and the Middle East (53). Nearly one-third of the conflicts occurred 
in Africa. As of 2002, there were ongoing armed conflicts in Central Africa 
Republic, Chad, Congo Brazzaville, Ethiopia, Cote D’Ivoire (Ivory Coast), 
Liberia, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. The severity of the conflicts 
oscillated from minor to serious incidences. Some have persisted on a 
continuous basis while others erupt intermittently.  
Several explanations have been proffered for violent conflicts around the world. 
Bonneuil and Auriat (2000: 563) based on their analysis of 163 ethnic conflicts 
across Africa, Asia, Europe, Middle East and Americas between 1945 and 1994 
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reported that “mobilization, slight discrimination, migration distress, religion 
and repression” were responsible for the violent conflicts. Gurr (1993: 189) also 
reported that “economic and social grievances and demands for greater political 
rights … were weakly but consistently correlated” with violent conflicts and 
communal protests. He also reported that “resentments about restricted access to 
political positions and a collective history of lost autonomy drive separatist 
demands and rebellion generally” (Ibid: 189).  
Other researchers have also identified many other factors that induce violent 
conflicts have also been identified by several researchers They include 
repression; failure of nation-building; worsening economic conditions that 
acerbate clientelism and disaffection by excluded groups; land dispossession; 
migration and conflicts between settler and their host populations; election-
related grievances; appointment/grading of traditional rulers by government; 
mineral exploitation and environmental degradation which cause rivalry among 
groups in the environment; resentment among local population that are excluded 
from the benefits of mining; weakening of state power due to a variety of 
reasons – including democratisation accompanied by adjustment programme 
that widens inequality and worsens poverty among a large proportion of the 
population (Zack-Williams 1999; Lewis et al. 2001; Bratton et al. 2004; Collier 
and Hoeffler, 2002; Moore 1998; Bonneuvil and Auriat 2000, Gurr and Moore 
1997; Blomberg and Hess, 2002; Lind and Sturman 2002; Alemika 2002; 
Imobighe 2003).  On the other hand, Hegre, et al. (2001) found that strong 
authoritarian and democratic states experience few civil wars compared to states 
that are weakly authoritarian or democratic.  The enumerated sources of violent 
conflicts support the observation by Neumayer (2003) that ‘good political 
governance and good economic policies’ can reduce violence. 
4. Method of Data Collection and Analysis 
4.1 Data Collection 
The data for this study were obtained from round 2 of the Afrobarometer survey 
in fifteen African countries. Data were collected through interviews of a 
representative sample of adult population (those eighteen years and older) in 
each of the countries based on a multi-stage, stratified, clustered sampling 
approach. A total of 23,197 respondents were interviewed in the countries. In 
most of the countries,  sample sizes of 1,200 respondents, large enough to 
produce a margin of sampling error of (+ or -) 3 percent at a confidence level of 
95 percent was drawn. The sample size for each of the countries were Botswana 
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(1200), Cape Verde (1268), Ghana (1200), Kenya (2398), Lesotho (1200), 
Malawi (1200), Mali (1283), Mozambique (1400), Namibia (1200), Nigeria 
(2438), Senegal (1200), South Africa (2400),Tanzania (1200), Uganda (2400) 
and Zambia (1200). In some of the countries (Cape Verde, Nigeria, Kenya, 
South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda), certain groups were over-sampled in order 
to permit analysis of sub-national groups. However in country analysis and in 
this pooled data for the fifteen countries, within-country and across-countries 
statistical weights were introduced to ensure that national samples were 
representative and each country adjusted or standardised to 1200 respondents. 
The protocol of sampling and the questionnaire for Afrobarometer survey are 
available on the network’s web (www.afrobarometer.org).  
4.2 Methods of Analysis 
Several statistical analytical techniques were employed. They range from 
descriptive analysis (frequencies, percentages and means), factor analysis, scale 
item reliability analysis and correlation analysis to multiple (OLS) regression. 
The descriptive statistics were in many cases those already computed and 
published in the Afrobarometer Round 2: Compendium of Comparative Results 
From a 15-Country Survey by Bratton et al. (2004: www.afrobarometer.org). 
Details of the analytical procedures used in the analysis component of the study 
are described later in the relevant sections. 
5. Analysis 
5.1 Perceptions of Legitimacy, Rule of Law and 
Violent Conflicts  
This section analyses the perceptions of the respondents regarding the 
legitimacy of the constitutional and legal order, and the political and economic 
regimes of their respective countries. It also discusses the respondents’ 
experiences of violent conflicts within their families and communities, and 
between groups within their countries.  
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5.1.1 Legitimacy of Constitutional and Legal Order 
Legitimacy involves expectation and evaluation because it may be ascribed to 
regimes and institutions prospectively, temporally, and retrospectively.  
• In prospective terms, legitimacy is accorded in expectation that regimes 
and institutions will meet certain goals and advance some interests. 
• In temporal terms, institutions and regimes are evaluated as to whether 
they are satisfying the needs which they are obliged to satisfy. 
• In retrospective terms, evaluation is backward-looking regarding whether 
or not regimes and institutions satisfy the needs of their constituencies. 
The last two dimensions of legitimacy relate to the performance of governments 
while the first concerns system legitimacy. 
Several factors have impaired the legitimacy of regimes and governments in 
Africa, amongst which is the colonial legacy of authoritarianism. The colonial 
political economy has been variously classified as imperialistic, despotic, 
authoritarian and exploitative. Shivji (1990: 383) observes that it was despotic. 
According to him: 
‘Its legal order was exactly the opposite of that prescribed by 
constitutionalism. Power was concentrated in the executive, usually 
in the person of governor, while justice was dispensed by an 
administrator, often a district commissioner. The legislature, if one 
existed at all, was packed by the governor’s appointees while 
fundamental human rights, particularly those which might have had 
any political impact, were conspicuous by their absence …  Forced 
labour and unlimited power of arrest by administrators completed 
the armoury of an essentially quasi-military colonial state. 
The deeper structures of the colonial political and legal order were 
inherited or, in some cases, reorganized to reinforce despotism in 
the post-independence period. The constitutional order established 
at independence was therefore, as it were, an excrescence. Through 
amendment, modifications or overthrow, constitutions soon came to 
correspond to the overall legal order’. 
Post-colonial African states were characterised by authoritarianism, 
patrimonialism or outright kleptocracy. While embracing the despotism of the 
colonial state, they sought for its justification in African tradition, where it was 
said (usually a misrepresentation of power configuration in pre-colonial Africa), 
that power was undivided in the king who symbolises a father figure. The 
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ideology was given a boost by the departing colonisers who advised that 
emergent post-colonial states needed strong states and government to hold 
together the marriage of the diverse peoples that they had forcibly solemnised 
during colonial domination. Post-colonial states became characterized by not 
only despotism but exclusion, non-alternation of power, corruption, and ethnic 
and religious identity mobilisation, leading in many cases to economic decline, 
civil wars and violent conflicts. Under these circumstances, the state itself, 
rather than being a conflict mediator, became the object and theatre of conflict. 
Constitution is the primary law of modern society. It defines the nature and 
structure of government; function and constitution of government; the scope and 
limitation of governmental power; political rights and obligations of the citizens, 
framework for the economy and the mechanisms for conflict resolution between 
levels and organs of government; between citizens and governments, between 
private corporate groups and among citizens. In a democracy, therefore, 
governments derive their power and authority under or from the constitution. 
Citizens in the fifteen African countries covered by Afrobarometer in Round 2 
survey were asked whether they agree or disagree that their national constitution 
expresses their values and hopes. The majority (more than 50%) of citizens in 
fourteen countries agree that their “constitution expresses the values and hopes” 
(table 1). In Mozambique, less than a half (48%) of the respondents agreed that 
their constitution expresses their values and hopes. But this represented a 
majority (63%) of those who offered opinion on the question. A high percentage 
of the sample (25%) chose ‘don’t know’ response, and only 18% actually 
disagreed that the constitution represent the values and hopes of people in the 
country. 
A significant proportion of respondents in many countries (Mozambique, Cape 
Verde, Senegal, Mali, Ghana, Tanzania and Zambia) said they do not know 
whether or not their constitution represents their value and hopes. This may be 
attributed to a number of factors such as illiteracy and the crafting of 
constitutions in technical and English or other foreign language without 
translation to or dissemination in local languages. The provisions of the 
constitution, in the absence of relevant and comprehensive civic education, are 
inaccessible to the average citizens in African countries. But lack of knowledge 
of constitutional provisions is not a peculiar problem of African countries and 
citizens.   The problem draws attention to the exclusionary and elitist process of 
constitution-making and the disconnectedness of the government from a vast 
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The cardinal element of the rule of law is the subjection of every citizen to law 
administered by the ordinary court of the land. This is often expressed by the 
antinomy of the ‘rule of law versus rule of man’. An independent judiciary, 
capable of protecting the rights of citizens and administering law impartially, is 
a precondition for the consolidation of the rule of law. To what extent do 
citizens in the countries ascribed legitimacy to the powers of the police and 
courts to enforce and administer law respectively? The information in table 1 
shows that citizens in the countries generally recognise or accept that the courts 
and police have rights or power to administer and enforce the law. Therefore, 
there is no generalised contest of the rights and powers of police and courts 
regarding law enforcement and administration in the countries. But there is a 
difference between rights to enforce and administer law and the efficacy or 
capacity of the agencies to perform the duties. From the analysis in table 1, it 
may be inferred that the constitutional and legal order in the countries enjoyed 
moderate legitimacy from the citizens.  
5.1.2 Legitimacy of Economic and Political Regimes 
The fifteen countries in the survey have embraced reforms toward political and 
economic liberalism. Economic reforms formally adopted by the countries 
emphasize deregulation, privatisation and in some cases commercialisation of 
social service provision by the state. In essence, the countries are in transition to 
liberal democracy and its economic foundation – capitalism. What are the 
attitudes of the citizens towards free market and the economic reforms being 
pursued by their respective governments? Data presented in table 2 provide 
some answers. In all the countries, citizens preferred a mixed economy – one in 
which both the private sector and the state play important roles. However, 
countries differ in terms of which of the two – free market or the state – should 
play a dominant role. A marginal majority of respondents from Ghana, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Nigeria and Tanzania preferred a ‘free market economy to an 
economy run by the government’. In contrast, more respondents from Botswana, 
Kenya, Lesotho, Mali, and Senegal prefer a government-run economy to a free 
market economy. Overall, an average of 44% of respondents from all the 
countries prefer free market economy compared to 37% who prefer government-
run economy, while an average of 13% of the respondents were indifferent to 
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At least three alternative explanations can be offered for the preference for 
mixed economy. First is historical. After independence, the modernisation 
ideology and policies that guided development planning in African countries 
stressed the need for strong governments to hold together the countries from 
falling apart due to primordial cleavages and conflicts. It was also stressed that 
the governments needed to play a dominant role in the economy.  The reasoning 
was that widespread poverty and lack of entrepreneurship that characterised the 
newly independent countries necessitated government involvement in 
investment in the economy so as to stimulate ‘development’. In some cases, 
arguments for equity and prevention of gross inequalities between groups and 
regions were also made in support of a ‘mixed economy’ in Africa. The extent 
to which this perspective, widely canvassed by former colonisers on the 
continent and the international ‘development’ agencies, influenced the freezing 
of the political space (in the form of one-party or military authoritarianism from 
the second-half of the 1960 decade until recently) has not been adequately 
explored by social scientists and historians.  
Second, the adoption of the mixed economy system by African countries 
provided the rulers with strategic resources for clientelism at two levels – in 
respect of the relation between citizens and government, and between the rulers 
and their supporters/cronies.  In relation to the citizens, successive governments 
gave the impression that they were able to provide access to education, health 
care and other social welfare without fees.  As a result, political campaigns were 
dominated by promises of free education, free health care, and universal free 
access to all sorts of public utilities such as water and electricity. But most of the 
facilities were not provided and are not being provided for the majority of 
citizens, and where they are/were provided, public utilities and social services 
are/were grossly inefficient. However, this does not prevent citizens from 
continuing to demand that government play a dominant role in the economy and 
delivery of services, which allows the government to continue to use promises 
of their provisioning to sustain a patron-client relation. In relation to the elites, 
the mixed economy provided enormous opportunity for various patronages and 
corrupt enrichment.  
Third, preference for a mixed economy by the citizens may be interpreted as a 
reflection of their vision of a good society – one in which the state plays an 
active role in the economy to moderate deprivation or poverty, unjustifiable 
inequality, and exploitation. In any case, advanced capitalist societies frequently 
intervene in their economies to influence foreign exchange rates, interest rates, 
to control inflation, provide subsidies, to protect local industries and of course to 
deliver social welfare services. But these same countries ask less developed 
countries to refrain from such interventions and to rather open their economies 
to dumping and exploitation by foreign industries.  
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In at least two-thirds of the fifteen countries, more than 50% of the respondents 
say that the “government’s economic policies have hurt most people and only 
benefited a few”. More than 60% of respondents in Ghana, Malawi, Nigeria, 
Uganda and Zambia offered this response. Overall, an average of 61% of the 
respondents from the fifteen countries say that government economic polices 
have hurt most people and benefited only a few. The high percentage of 
response may be an explanation for the preference of mixed economy. There is 
no widespread support for the economic policies and programmes of the 
countries.  
There are different types of political regimes. What sort of regime is preferred 
by citizens in the fifteen African countries? A significant majority of them in 
each of the countries preferred democracy to any other form of government 
(table 3). However, about 1 in 5 respondents in Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia and 
Nigeria said that non-democratic government can be preferable in some 
circumstances. Overall, more than three-fifths of respondents preferred 
democracy to any other form of government. 
The data suggest substantial support for democratisation in the countries. 
Citizens also variously describe the current level of democracy in their 
countries. The majority of them consider their countries to be either a 
democracy with minor problems or a democracy with major problems. Only a 
small proportion classified their country an entirely undemocratic. There is 
substantial preference for democracy as well as favourable perceptions of the 
constitution as an expression of the values and hopes of citizens by majority of 
respondents in all the fifteen countries. However, citizens in many countries 
reported dissatisfaction with the way democracy works, which is a reflection of 
the government in power rather than the democratic regime. The implication is 
that elected officials – executive and legislature are not showing satisfactory 
performance. There are variations across the countries regarding satisfaction 
with democracy. The highest levels of satisfaction were reported in Kenya, 
Ghana, Mali, Namibia, Tanzania and Uganda while high levels of dissatisfaction 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5.1.3 Legitimacy of Government 
Analysis of legitimacy should distinguish between system (democracy, free 
market, planned or mixed economy) and government legitimacy. The first is 
fundamental and has to do with the consensus as to the way society should be 
politically and economically organised. The legitimacy of government refers to 
the extent to which the incumbent government is considered desirable or 
acceptable based on the manner in which it ascended to power, its policies, 
programmes and performances. Trust questions tap the legitimacy of 
government rather than the system or regime legitimacy.  
A common indicator of legitimacy of government in the literature is the extent 
to which citizens express trust in their leaders or rulers. Citizens in Ghana, Mali, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Senegal, Tanzania, Malawi and Uganda express a lot or 
a very great deal of trust in their President. In contrast, citizens of Cape Verde, 
Nigeria and South Africa show marked distrust for their leaders. The extent of 
trust in the army, courts of law, police, parliament, local government and 
electoral commission is presented in table 4.  
Overall, level of trust in political institutions was weak ranging from an average 
of 56% for the presidents to 36% for electoral commissions. The mean scores on 
a composite scale for trust in core political institutions are presented in table 11.   
5.1.4 Official Corruption 
Corruption mitigates trust and legitimacy in government institutions and 
officials. Citizens in the various countries think that most or all people in some 
institutions are corrupt. Nigerians, in particular, think that most or all of the 
people in the police, electoral commission, elected officials as well as the 
president and officials in his office are corrupt. Across the countries, citizens 
perceive more corruption in the police and electoral commission (Table 5). 
Composite corruption scale mean values for each country are presented in table 
11. The mean figures indicate a very high perception of public corruption in 
Nigeria, Mali, Malawi and Uganda. In contrast, respondents from Namibia, 
Cape Verde, Lesotho and South Africa have lower perceptions of public 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5.1.5 Rule of Law 
The rule of law doctrine seeks (a) to prohibit arbitrary, discretionary and 
oppressive exercise of power by government organs and private agencies; (b) to 
enhance the freedom and dignity of citizens, and (c) to promote openness or 
transparency in the enforcement of laws. Therefore, the rule of law is absent or 
weak wherever and whenever governance is characterised by arbitrariness, ad 
hoc rules, executive lawless and impunity, unequal treatment of citizens under 
the law, retroactive legislation, disregard of constitutional and statutory 
provisions by government and citizens, and discrimination by public agencies. 
To what extent are the countries governed in accordance with the rule of law? 
Table 6 presents the responses of the respondents to questions on equal 
treatment of citizens under the law, and presidential impunity. In most countries, 
with the exception of Nigeria, citizens reported that their President rarely or 
never ignores the constitution. Presidential impunity was reported by the 
majority (53%) of Nigerians and to a lesser extent by citizens of Malawi (31%); 
Uganda (30%); Kenya (29%) and Senegal (25%) where at least one-quarter of 
the respondents said the president always or often ignores the constitution 
(Table 6).  
Citizens in fourteen countries say that ‘freedom from being arrested when you 
are innocent’ is better or much better under the present government. The 
exceptional case of Botswana is not surprising because of the country’s long 
democratic culture. But nonetheless, it has the highest percentage of citizens 
(24%) responding that such freedom has become worse or much worse. 
However, nearly three-fifths of respondents from the country also responded 
that the freedom is the same – neither worse or better, which reflects stability in 
the protection of freedom. This shows that though the country has a satisfactory 
level of protection of freedom from unwarranted arrest, the situation may be 
slipping and requires action to halt a further slide. 
In the majority of the countries, less than 50% of the respondents say that ‘equal 
and fair treatment for all by people by the government’ is better or much better. 
The exceptions are Ghana (54%); Kenya (65%); Malawi (56%); Mali (58%); 
Namibia (79%) and Uganda (51%). In Nigeria, more citizens (38% against 34%) 
say that equal treatment is even worse or much worse under the present elected 
government than the former military government. In South Africa, as many as 
29% of the respondents also say that the unequal treatment of citizens by 
government is worse or much worse (although they are not as near as high as 
48% who felt there has been better or much better condition of equality of 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The rule of law also requires effective and equitable enforcement of law against 
offenders. More than three-quarters of the citizens in each of the countries say 
that it is very likely or likely that the law will be enforced against them if they 
committed a serious crime (table 7). This reflects a high perception of capacity 
of law enforcement and administration by the relevant agencies. However, the 
extent to which this perception reflects reality is a different issue, especially in 
the light of chaos and conflicts that prevail in many African countries. Of 
significance is the fact that criminologists regard such a perception as an 
important deterrent against involvement in criminal behaviours and activities.  
In many of the countries (especially Kenya, Uganda and Lesotho, and also 
Namibia, Zambia, Ghana, Mali and Tanzania), citizens felt that their new 
government is more or much more able to enforce the law than the previous 
system of government (Table 7). However, of serious concern is that in Nigeria 
and South Africa, two important countries with a legacy of authoritarian military 
rule and an obnoxious apartheid system (SA), substantial proportions of the 
citizens felt that their presently elected governments are less or much less able to 
enforce the law. The two countries do experience high level of violent conflicts 
(Nigeria) and violent crimes (South Africa). 
5.1.6 Violent Conflicts 
The majority of African countries have witnessed and continue to experience 
violent conflicts and civil wars since the 1960s. Notable among these in sub-
Saharan Africa are Rwanda, Burundi, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Sudan, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Angola, Uganda and Nigeria. 
Sources of conflicts include authoritarianism of one party or military rule, 
imposition of Islamic rule in a multi-religious society, ethno-regional and 
religious antagonism due to clientelism and mobilisation of primordial identities, 
and conflict over resources. The mis-governance of African nations created a 
large army of unemployed persons, deprived within the context of gross 
inequalities. Thus, politicians on both sides (i.e. government and opposition), 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Most African countries have experienced some form of violent conflicts since 
the 1960s when many of them gained independence from their colonisers. Such 
conflicts range from civil war, intermittent ethnic and religious violent conflicts; 
rebellion and armed opposition to communal violence arising from disputes over 
resources, elections and appointment of traditional rulers. Data presented in 
table 8 indicate high incidences of violent conflicts within community and 
between different groups in most of the fifteen countries. A large majority of 
respondents in Nigeria (74%) and Uganda (75%) reported frequent (sometimes, 
often/always) incidences of violent conflicts between groups in their countries. 
More than half of the respondents in Ghana (54%), Kenya (63%) and Lesotho 
(61%) also reported high incidences of inter-group violent conflicts. High levels 
of violent conflicts within community were also reported in Uganda, Lesotho, 
Zambia, Botswana and Kenya. While incidences of violent conflicts within the 
family was not as high as that within community and between groups, it was 
nonetheless substantial especially in countries like Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia where at least 20% of the 
respondent say that violent conflicts occur sometimes, often or always within 
their families (table 8).  
What sort of grievances lead to violent conflicts in these countries? Overall the 
leading sources of violent conflicts between groups in the country, identified by 
the respondents (table 8) were grievances or disputes relating to politics and 
political leadership (16%), resource and boundary/land (15%) and economic 
problems and poverty (10%).  Beyond this overall picture for the fifteen 
countries, there are some important sources in different countries. In Nigeria, 
major sources of conflicts are religious differences (24%), resource and 
land/boundary disputes (21%), politics and political leadership disputes (16%) 
and ethnic differences (14%).  Personal misconduct and lack of respect featured 
prominently as sources of violent conflicts in Botswana, Cape Verde and 
Lesotho.  In Cape Verde, Lesotho and Namibia alcohol and drugs were 
identified as sources of violent conflicts by fourteen percent or more 
respondents. Disputes over traditional leadership feature as important source of 
violent conflicts in Botswana and Cape Verde. Ethnic differences were indicated 
by respondents from Botswana as a major source of conflicts. Generally, violent 
conflicts in the countries were due to political, economic and socio-cultural 
factors. However, no single factor was so dominant in any country as to indicate 
that the disputes associated with them cannot be resolved by democratic and 
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One of the theoretical explanations of violence in criminology states that 
violence is learned within a cultural or value system that either encourages or 
rewards it or at least tolerates it. Stated otherwise, the theory posits that positive 
values and attitudes towards violence increase the incidence and prevalence of 
violent conflicts and behaviours (Wolfgang and Ferracuti 1968). Responses 
presented in table 9 indicate that a large majority of citizens in the fifteen 
countries (a) do not subscribe to the use of violence in politics; (b) did not ‘use 
violence for a political cause’ during the past year, and (c) would turn to the 
police for help if they were a victim of violent crime rather than resort to 
vigilantism or self-help as a means of revenge (table 9).  
The performance of the government in managing conflict is, however, rated 
average, as only an average of 56% of the respondents across the countries say 
that their government is ‘handling conflicts between communities’ fairly or very 
well.  More than 70% of respondents in Ghana, Kenya, Mali and Tanzania rated 
their governments handling of inter-group conflicts as fairly well or very well 
(table 9). 
5.2 Sources of Political Trust  
This section employs multivariate statistical analytical methods to explore the 
sources of political support in the fifteen countries as well as in each country in 
the survey. Factor analysis of responses to several questions was undertaken. 
The selection of questions for analysis was guided by both theoretical and 
empirical literature on sources of political support. We developed six composite 
scales on trust, performance of government, civil rights condition, corruption, 
effective law enforcement and poverty. The variables are interrelated. 
Corruption, for example, will hinder performance, civil right protection, rule of 
law and effective law enforcement while aggravating poverty and inequality.  
5.2.1 Factor analysis and scale reliability of variables in the 
regression analysis 
The Afrobarometer survey instrument contained several questions that tap 
different aspects of governance (already analysed in tables 1-9).  Six scales were 
constructed using factor analysis method.  
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These six scales explained 52.8% of the total variance of the issue of which they 
are sub-domains. Our interpretation is that all six scales measure aspects of 
democratic governance or democratic legitimacy. The questions that were 
loaded on each of the scales were subjected to reliability analysis, the results of 
which are also presented in table 10. Each of the scales exhibited at least .74 
reliability coefficients, which is relatively high.  
5.2.2 Analyses of the countries’ mean scale scores 
Table 11 presents descriptive statistical information for each of the scales for 
each of the fifteen countries.  The mean scores provide a measure for all of the 
countries. From the figures in table 11, perceptions of government’s proper 
management of the economy and social sectors were most positive in Kenya, 
Namibia, Tanzania, Ghana and Mali but were most negative in Malawi, Nigeria, 
and Zambia. Elected and public officials in Nigeria, Mali, Malawi and Uganda 
were perceived as largely corrupt. In contrast, such officials were seen as less 
corrupt in Namibia, South Africa, Cape Verde, Botswana and Kenya. The 
lowest incidences of poverty were reported in Namibia, South Africa and Kenya 
while the highest incidence was recorded in Malawi. 
The data as analysed in table 11 also indicate that political trust was highest in 
Senegal, Mali, Tanzania, Mozambique and Malawi but lowest in Nigeria, South 
Africa, Cape Verde and Zambia. These results were derived through a 
composite scale in which nine different officials and institutions (e.g. president, 
legislatures (national and regional), police, courts, electoral commission, etc.) 
were included, some of which were highly trusted and others highly distrusted 
(see table 4). In all the countries, protection of civil rights was perceived as 
relatively better under the present government compared to the past system of 
government. The majority of the respondents in all the countries also reported 
that the law was likely to be enforced if they violated it. This belief was highest 
in Ghana, Zambia, Senegal, Uganda, Botswana, Cape Verde and Kenya, and 
lowest in Mozambique.  
Law enforcement capacity is an aspect of the rule of law. Citizens’ perception of 
high capacity for law enforcement by their government may be interpreted in 
two different ways, as either an indicator of repression in the form of a police 
state, or in terms of effectiveness of the law enforcement and administration 
machinery. In Africa, police capacity for democratic policing is generally low 
due to a legacy of repression and impunity stretching back to colonial rule 
(Alemika 2003a, 2003b, 1993; Shivji 1990). Given the level of conflicts and 
chaos in many of these countries, the feeling by the respondents that law will be 
enforced against them may be mistaken. 
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Table 11:  Mean Scale Scores for Pooled Data and Individual Country 







2.86 3.40 1.79 1.39 4.02 2.02 
Botswana 2.95 2.97 1.64 1.22 4.16 2.00 
Cape Verde 2.77 3.38 1.54 1.38 4.11 1.68 
Ghana 3.17 3.49 1.71 1.16 4.30 2.04 
Kenya 3.44 3.54 1.65 1.05 4.11 2.03 
Lesotho 2.82 3.36 1.59 1.60 3.78 2.04 
Malawi 2.18 3.61 2.06 2.05 4.02 2.22 
Mali 3.15 3.63 2.27 1.45 3.72 2.56 
Mozambique 2.85 3.31 1.72 1.43 3.40 2.31 
Namibia 3.26 3.70 1.43 0.70 3.86 2.08 
Nigeria 2.23 3.16 2.31 1.29 3.88 0.94 
Senegal 2.79 3.39 1.78 1.51 4.26 2.69 
South Africa 2.43 3.40 1.54 0.72 3.81 1.56 
Tanzania 3.21 3.37 1.74 1.38 3.94 2.44 
Uganda 3.03 3.23 2.10 1.69 4.17 2.04 
Zambia 2.56 3.50 1.76 1.64 4.22 1.63 
+ Every question used for the constructions of the scale was measured on five points lowest – 
highest. However, those marked with a  plus sign were on 0-4 scale while the rest were on 1-5 
scale.  
5.2.3 Correlates of Political Trust 
Political trust is correlated with a number of factors involved in governance. 
Table 12 presents the bivariate correlation between political trust and the 
independent variables in the regression analysis. Of the nine independent 
variables, trust is correlated with eight, gender being the only exception. The 
strength of the correlation coefficients in table 12 is not very high and indicates 
that multicollinearity is not a problem in the regression analysis.  
Trust is relatively highly correlated with performance and civil rights, both of 
which are indicative of how well or badly a government is administering a 
country. Bivartiate correlations, however, do not provide a strong evidence of 
relationship as it may be influenced by a third (extraneous) variable. This is 

































































































































































































































































































































































5.2.4 Determinants of Political Trust 
Two sets of analyses are presented in table 13. The first presents the result 
(coefficients) of regression analysis of determinants of political trust for all the 
15 countries, while the second presents estimations for each of the countries. In 
both sets of analysis, the same variables were used. 
The main findings from the regression analysis in table 13 can be summarised as 
follows: 
• Performance of government in the management of the economy and 
social sector is the most important predictor of political trust. This 
implies that in countries where government is adjudged to have handled 
the management of the economy and social services (education, health 
and water supply) either well or very well, citizens would have greater 
trust in their political institutions. 
• Civil rights condition is also an important predictor of political trust. 
Citizens of countries in which civil rights (expression, voting, non-
arbitrary and repressive arrests, association) are better protected than the 
previous system government will have greater trust than countries where 
this was not the case. 
• Corruption diminishes citizens’ trust in the country’s political 
institutions. 
• While poverty, law enforcement capacity, party affiliation, residence and 
age were significant predictors for the pooled data in respect of the 
countries, they were not consistently significant across the countries.  
• Gender was not a significant predictor in most countries except in Cape 
Verde, and three contiguous Eastern African countries of Tanzania, 
Uganda, and Zambia. Of all the variables, gender, has the least predictive 
value. And this confirms the bivariate correlation estimation (table 12). 
• Malawi virtually reproduced the results obtained for the combined fifteen 
countries. 
• The overall explanatory power of the regression estimation is modest for 
the combined 15 countries (R2 = .220) and for several other countries, 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The analysis confirms the findings in many previous research works in terms of 
the significance of performance in political trust in government. Satisfactory 
performance enhances trust in government while poor performance undermines 
trust. However, poor performance of government in power does not threaten the 
legitimacy of the regime or preference for juridical and democratic political 
regimes in the short-run (Weil 1989; Vassilev 2004). Despite dissatisfaction 
with governance in many of the countries and the relative distrust of 
government, preference for democracy has been relatively stable (see 
Afrobarometer working papers on preference for democracy in the round 1 and 
2 surveys for various countries (www.afrobarometer.org); Bratton et al. 2004; 
and for Nigeria, see Lewis et al. 2001).     
6. Discussion 
In this paper, we have provided a descriptive statistical analysis of the extent of 
legitimacy of constitutional and juridical, economic and political systems in 15 
African countries. We also analysed the level of trust in the political institutions 
of these countries, as well as the rule of law and violent conflicts within the 
nations. The analyses indicate the following: 
• There is support for the national constitutions by the majority of the 
respondents in all the countries; 
• Citizens in the countries generally accepted that the courts and police 
have the right to administer and enforce the law respectively. Thus, a 
diffused legitimacy was accorded the institutions. 
• African citizens preferred a ‘mixed economy’ in which both the 
government and market play active role. This runs counter to the 
economic policy of privatisation of public enterprises and utilities as well 
as state abdication of responsibility for basic social services (especially 
education and health care) being forced upon African countries by IMF, 
World Bank and advanced capitalist societies. It is therefore not 
surprising that more than three-fifths of the respondents in the 15 
countries said that government economic policies have hurt most people 
and benefited only a few.  
• Democracy is the preferred form of governance in all the countries. 
However, although more than one half (54%) respondents across the 
fifteen countries express satisfaction in the way democracy works in their 
countries, more than one-third (36%) of respondents in those countries 
were dissatisfied. 
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• Trust in public institutions was generally low, although a marginal 
majority expresses trust in their president, the army and the courts of law. 
• Unequal treatment of people under the law was reported by more than 
two-fifths (42%), although 47% said unequal treatment rarely or never 
happened. Disregard for national constitutions was reported by 23%, such 
impunity was reported by a majority in Nigeria. However, in all the 
countries, except Botswana, freedom from being arrested when one is 
innocent was said to be either better or much better under the present 
system of government compared to the past system. In Botswana, such 
freedom was widely reported as being the same during the two periods, 
and this was perhaps due to a relatively long-term culture of absence of 
authoritarianism in that country. 
• There was a relatively high perception of corruption among elected and 
public officials in the fifteen countries. The lowest level of corruption was 
perceived in respect of the president and officials in his office (19%), 
while the highest level was perceived among the police. There is a need, 
however, to appreciate that perception is affected by contact. Of all the 
listed agencies, the police are the ones that citizens are most likely to have 
contact with and often involuntarily. These may affect both the level of 
awareness and perception of corruption. Presidents, especially African 
ones, including their activities, are inaccessible to the average citizens, 
and therefore there will be poor knowledge of corruption in his office. 
However, more citizens said that their governments were fighting 
corruption either fairly badly or very badly. 
• More than two-fifths of the respondents reported that violent conflicts 
occur sometimes, often or always in their communities and among 
different groups in their countries. 
• Contrary to the distorted picture of conflicts in Africa, as solely 
expressions of ethnic and religious antagonisms, projected by Western 
media and scholars, violent conflicts in the countries were caused by 
several factors. Disputes and grievances (not greed as IMF/World Bank 
researchers insist - e.g. Collier and Hoeffler 2002) over political 
leadership, land and resources, economic problems and poverty, ethnic 
differences, personal misconduct and drugs/alcohol were reported as 
sources of violent conflicts by the respondents. Only in Nigeria, where 
24% and 14% identified ethnic and religious differences respectively, and 
Botswana where 19% identified ethnic differences, were the two factors 
identified by a significant proportion of the respondents (table 8). 
• In all the countries, the use of violence for the pursuit of political 
objectives and resorting to vigilantism were rejected by the respondents. 
However, nearly a third of the respondents said that the government was 
handling conflicts between communities fairly badly or very badly. 
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• Political trust is influenced principally by the performance of government 
in the management of the economy and social services and the protection 
of civil rights. Corruption also negatively influences trust in political 
institutions.  
   
These findings point to both the progress as well as the challenges of democratic 
transition and consolidation in Africa. As Monga (1997) has pointed out, 
democratisation in Africa has been characterised by many problems including 
the return of previous autocrats to power through elections; weak and fragile 
political parties; manipulation of electoral process; a narrow political field; a 
constrained civil society; a controlled press; the absence of civility among the 
rulers in their relations with opposition and citizens at large, and support by 
powerful nations for friendly dictators on the continent. These problems, along 
with the attempt at a hasty imposition of capitalist political economy through 
adjustment programmes by IMF, World Bank and advanced capitalist nations 
may delay democratic consolidation if not reverse democratisation in many of 
the transitional countries in Africa.  
The greatest danger to democratisation on the continent is the structural 
adjustment programme which has been implemented by many African countries 
under the dictation and supervision of IMF and World Bank with the support of 
the G8 countries since the 1980s. Such adjustment programmes have produced 
serious social, economic and political crises. These crises manifest as 
deterioration of social services (especially education and health care) and public 
utilities, intensification of violent conflicts among groups competing for scarce 
resources; deepening economic crises of poverty, unemployment and 
retrenchment, de-industrialisation, net capital outflow and weak currencies and 
economic-related conflicts such as strikes, state repression of labour rights, 
protests against government economic deregulation and privatisation 
programmes. The programmes negate the interests of the African peoples 
expressed in this study. Not surprising, an overwhelming majority of the citizens 
in the countries reported that such programmes hurt most people and benefited 
only a few. Herein lies the threat to democratisation in Africa - exogenous 
imposition of economic programmes that are harmful or hurtful to the African 
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